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We consider the recent relativistic bit commitment protocol introduced by Lunghi et al
[Phys. Rev. Lett. 2015] and present a new security analysis against classical attacks. In particu-
lar, while the initial complexity of the protocol scaled double-exponentially with the commitment
time, our analysis shows that the correct dependence is only linear. This has dramatic implications
in terms of implementation: in particular, the commitment time can easily be made arbitrarily long,
by only requiring both parties to communicate classically and perform efficient classical computa-
tion.
Over the last decades, which witnessed the rapid ex-
pansion of quantum information, a new trend has devel-
oped: trying to obtain security guarantees based solely
on the laws of physics. Perhaps the most compelling ex-
ample is quantum key distribution [1, 2] where two dis-
tant parties can exploit quantum theory to extract un-
conditionally secure keys provided that they have access
to an untrusted quantum channel and an authenticated
classical channel. However, many cryptographic applica-
tions cannot be obtained only with secure key distribu-
tion. One important example is two-party cryptography,
which deals with the setting where Alice and Bob want to
perform a cryptographic task but do not trust each other.
This is in contrast with key distribution where Alice and
Bob cooperate and fight against a possible eavesdropper.
Two-party cryptography has numerous applications,
ranging from authentication to distributed cryptography
in the cloud. These protocols are usually separated into
building blocks, called primitives. One of the most stud-
ied primitives is bit commitment, which often gives a
strong indication of whether two-party cryptography is
possible or not in a given model. For example, there
are many constructions of bit commitment protocols un-
der computational assumptions [3–6]. It is then natural
to ask whether quantum theory can provide security for
two-party cryptographic primitives such as bit commit-
ment or oblivious transfer. A general no-go theorem was
proved in 1996 by Mayers and Lo-Chau [7, 8]. Several
attempts were made to circumvent this impossibility re-
sult by limiting the storage possibilities of the cheating
party [9, 10]. An alternative approach to obtain secure
primitives, pioneered by Kent [11], consists in combining
quantum theory with special relativity, more precisely
with the physical principle that information cannot prop-
agate faster than the speed of light. This has opened the
way to new, secure, bit commitment protocols [12–15],
with the caveat that the commitment time is not arbi-
trary long in general but depends on the physical distance
between the parties or on the number of parties involved.
A major open question of the field is therefore to design
a secure practical bit commitment protocol, for which
the commitment time can be increased arbitrarily at a
reasonable cost in terms of implementation complexity.
In this paper, we examine a protocol due to Lunghi et
al. [16], which is itself adapted from based on an earlier
proposal of Simard [17]. In their recent breakthrough pa-
per, Lunghi et al. showed that it was possible to extend
the commitment time by using a multi round generaliza-
tion of the Simard protocol, and established its security
against classical adversaries. Unfortunately, the required
resources scale double exponentially with the commit-
ment time, making the protocol impractical for realistic
applications. For instance, with the optimal configura-
tion on Earth (meaning that each party has agents oc-
cupying antipodal locations on Earth), the commitment
time is limited to less than a second. Here, we provide
a new security analysis establishing that the dependence
is in fact linear, provided that the dishonest player is
classical. This implies that arbitrary long commitment
times can be achieved even if both parties are only a
few kilometers apart. We first present the relativistic bit
commitment scheme studied by Lunghi et al. and we will
then establish its security.
The Lunghi et al. protocol.— We first recall the
protocol as well as the security definitions used and tim-
ing constraints. Both players, Alice and Bob, have agents
A1,A2 and B1,B2 present at two spatial locations 1
and 2. Let us consider the case where Alice makes the
commitment. The protocol (followed by honest players)
consists of 4 phases: preparation, commit, sustain and
reveal. The sustain phase is itself composed of many
rounds, and each such round involves a pair of agents
(alternating between locations 1 and 2) referred to as the
active players. Overall the bit commitment protocol goes
as follows.
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share k
random numbers a1, . . . , ak (resp. b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Fq,
for even k. Here, q is a prime power pn for some
prime p and Fq refers to the Galois field of order q.
2. Commit phase: B1 sends b1 to A1, who returns
y1 = a1+(d∗b1) where d ∈ {0, 1} is the committed
bit.
3. Sustain phase: at round i, active Bob sends bi ∈ Fq
to active Alice, who returns yi = ai + (ai−1 ∗ bi).
4. Reveal phase: A1 reveals d and ak to B1. B1 checks
that ak = yk + (ak−1 ∗ bk).
Here, + and ∗ refer to the field addition and multiplica-
tion in Fq.
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2Security definition.— We follow the definitions of
Ref. [16]. The security requirements differ in the case of
honest Alice and honest Bob. In the former case, Bob
should not be able to guess the committed value right
before the reveal phase. The protocol should therefore
be hiding, and it will actually be perfectly hiding here,
meaning that Bob cannot guess the committed bit value
better than with a random guess. Security for honest
Bob is defined differently: the protocol should be binding,
meaning that Alice should not be able to decide the value
of the committed bit after the commit phase. We follow
the standard definition for bit commitment (also used in
[16]). Let pd the probability that the Alice successfully
reveals bit value d. We say that the protocol is ε-binding
if p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε.
Timing constraints for the protocol.— The two
pairs (A1,B1) and (A2,B2) are at a certain distance d.
At each round j, there is an active (Alice, Bob) pair that
performs the protocol while the other, passive, pair waits.
At the end of round j, they switch roles and perform
round j + 1.
We require that round j finishes before any informa-
tion about bj−1 reaches the other Alice. For any j, we
therefore have the following : active Alice has no infor-
mation about bj−1. This means that yj is independent
of bj−1. This will be crucial in order to show security of
the protocol.
Our result.— Our main contribution is to present an
improved security proof for this protocol. In particular,
this allows for implementations of this protocol that last
for an (almost) arbitrary amount of time while the pre-
vious implementations were only secure for (much less
than) a second [16].
In order to prove the security of the protocol, we
present an inductive argument on the number of rounds
of the protocol and show that at each round, the cheat-
ing parameter for Alice increases by at most 2−(N−1)/2,
where N is the number of transmitted bits per round. In-
terestingly, the proof involves the study of CHSHq, which
is a generalization of the CHSH game in the field Fq.
Lunghi et al. also studied an extension of the CHSHq
game, which they called “Number on the Forehead game”.
However, their security proof quickly becomes inefficient
as the number of rounds increases.
The CHSHq game.— A crucial tool of our secu-
rity proof is the analysis of the CHSHq game introduced
by Buhrman and Massar [18]. This game is a natural
generalisation of the CHSH game to the field Fq, where
two non-communicating parties, Alice and Bob, are each
given an input x and y chosen uniformly at random from
Fq, and must output two numbers a, b ∈ Fq. They win
the game whenever the condition a + b = x ∗ y is sat-
isfied. The CHSHq game has been much less studied in
the litterature [16, 18, 19] than its q = 2 variant (see [20]
for a recent review on nonlocality). A recent result by
Bravarian and Shor [21] establishes rather tight bounds
on the classical and quantum values of the CHSHq game.
In particular, for prime or odd power of prime q , one
has:
ω(CHSHq) = O(q
−1/2−ε0), ω∗(CHSHq) ≤ q − 1
q
1√
q
+
1
q
,
for some absolute constant ε0 > 0.
These results hold only for a uniform input distribu-
tion. In order to use our inductive technique, we need to
bound the value of this game for unbalanced inputs. It
appears that the result of Bavarian and Shor doesn’t eas-
ily extend to this setting. We therefore developed new
proof techniques that are based on using non-signaling
constraints for the study of classical strategies.
Let us consider a family of games, denoted by
CHSHq(p), where games are parametrized by the prob-
ability distribution {px}x∈Fq for Alice’s input x satis-
fying the constraint maxx px ≤ p. For these games,
Bob’s input distribution is uniform over Fq. In partic-
ular, CHSHq(1/q) = {CHSHq}. The special case with
q = 2 was considered in [19] where the following results
are proved:
ω(CHSH2(p)) = (1 + p)/2,
ω∗(CHSH2(p)) ≤ (1 +
√
p2 + (1− p)2)/2.
Note that for q = 2, Alice’s input distribution is entirely
determined by the value of p. In order to prove upper
bounds on the value of games in CHSHq(p), we show that
if Alice and Bob can win such a game with high probabil-
ity then Alice has a method to obtain some information
about Bob’s input, something that is prohibited by the
non-signaling principle. This technique doesn’t directly
extend to the quantum setting because Alice’s method
requires her to perform her game strategy for different
inputs, which could disturb the underlying shared entan-
gled state.
Our main technical result is an upper bound on the
classical value for games in CHSHq(p).
Lemma 1. For any game G ∈ CHSHq(p), we have
ω(G) ≤ p+
√
2
q
. (1)
Proof. Fix a game G ∈ CHSHq(p). As usual, the classical
value of the game can always be achieved with a deter-
ministic strategy, meaning that without loss of generality,
Alice and Bob’s strategies can be modeled by functions
f and g, namely: a = f(x) and b = g(y). Define the vari-
able ryx equal to 1 if f(x) + g(y) = x ∗ y and 0 otherwise.
3Our proof is by contradiction: if ω(G) is too large,
then Alice could use her box to obtain some informa-
tion about y, which is prohibited by non signaling. More
precisely, consider the following strategy for Alice: pick
a random pair of distinct inputs x, x′ according to the
distribution {p}x∈Fq , i.e. with probability pxp′x/D where
D =
∑
x6=x′ pxp
′
x, and output the guess yˆ for y defined by
yˆ = (f(x)− f(x′)) ∗ (x− x′)−1. Denote by Sy the prob-
ability of correctly guessing the value y. Non signaling
imposes that Ey[Sy] = 1/q, since the value y is uniformly
distributed in Fq.
On the other hand, we note that if the game G is won
for both inputs (x, y) and (x′, y), then Alice’s strategy
outputs the correct value for y. Indeed, winning the game
implies that f(x)−f(x′) = (x−x′)∗y and therefore yˆ = y.
One immediately obtains a lower bound on Sy:
Sy ≥ 1
D
∑
x 6=x′
pxr
y
xp
′
xr
y
x′ ≥
∑
x 6=x′
pxr
y
xp
′
xr
y
x′ .
Consider the quantity ωy =
∑
x pxr
y
x. It satisfies:
(ωy)2 ≤
∑
x
p2x(r
y
x)
2+2Sy =
∑
x
(px)
2ryx+2Sy ≤ pωy+2sy,
where we used that (px)2 ≤ (maxx{px}) px ≤ ppx. This
implies that
ωy ≤ 1
2
(
p+
√
p2 + 8Sy
)
≤ p+√2Sy,
where the last inequality results from the concavity of
the square-root function.
Finally, ω(G) = Ey[ωy] by definition, and therefore:
ω(G) ≤ p+ 2Ey[
√
Sy] ≤ p+
√
2
√
Ey[Sy] ≤ p+
√
2/q,
which concludes the proof.
Security of the protocol.— The perfect hiding prop-
erty of this protocol has already been discussed in [16].
Indeed, at any point before the reveal phase, the Bobs
have no information about the committed bit d. Our
main contribution is the following binding property of
this protocol.
Theorem 1. This relativistic bit commitment scheme is
ε-binding with ε ≤ 2k
√
2
q where k is the number of rounds
used in the protocol.
Proof. We present here the main elements of the proof.
The technical details can be found in the Appendix. Let
us fix a cheating strategy for Alice, which consists of the
messages yj that het agents will send depending on the
current history and the bit d she wants to decommit to.
During the reveal phase, Alice successfully reveals d if A1
sends the correct ak to Bob. For a fixed cheating strat-
egy, ak is a function of d, b1, . . . , bk. However, during the
reveal phase, A1 has no information about bk. There-
fore, A1 will not be able to reveal ak if it has too much
dependence in bk on average on d . We show that this is
indeed the case.
Let P dj the maximal probability that the passive play-
ers guesses aj , given d. We have by definition
P 0k + P
1
k = 1 + ε.
In order to prove our statement, we show the following:
• P 01 + P 11 ≤ 1 + 2
√
2
q .
• For any d and j, P dj ≤ P dj−1 +
√
2
q .
To prove the first point, the idea is to reduce A2’s
strategy for guessing a1 into a strategy for CHSHq(1/2).
A1 receives b1 and outputs y1 which is independent of
d. A2 knows d and outputs a1. A2 outputs the correct
a1 when a1 + y1 = d ∗ b1. For an average d, this can
happen with probability at most CHSHq(1/2) ≤ 12+
√
2
q .
Therefore, we have
1
2
(
P 01 + P
1
1
) ≤ CHSHq(1/2) ≤ 1
2
+
√
2
q
which gives the desired result. The idea here is to reduce
passive Alice’s strategy for guessing a1 to a strategy for
winning CHSHq(1/2).
Similarly, fix a round j and d. We can reduce passive
Alice’s strategy for guessing aj to a strategy for winning
CHSHq(P
d
j−1). Indeed, active Alice knows bj and outputs
yj . Passive Alice knows aj−1 and outputs a guess aj . She
outputs the correct value if and only if aj+yj = bj ∗aj−1.
This corresponds to an instance of CHSHq where bj ∈
Fq is random and where active Alice (we consider here
active Alice at round j, which is the passive Alice at
round j − 1) can guess aj−1 with probability P dj−1. This
means that we can reduce passive Alice’s strategy for
guessing aj to a strategy for winning a certain game in
CHSHq(P
d
j−1). Using Proposition 1, we obtain P dj ≤
P dj−1 +
√
2
q . Putting all this together, we can conclude
that P 0k + P
1
k = 1 + 2k
√
2
q .
Experimental perspectives and open
questions.— Let us discuss the security of the
protocol in realistic conditions. Theorem 1 shows that
m = ε
√
q/2 rounds can be performed for a given level of
security . In particular, if the distance between A1/B1
and A2/B2 is d, then the commitment can be sustained
for a time
T = (d/c) ε
√
q/2,
where c is the speed of light. In particular, provided
that q  1/ε2, the commitment time can be made arbi-
trary long. For instance, taking 128 bits of security, i.e.
4ε = 2−128 and q = 2340 gives T ≈ 3 ·1012(d/c), that is ap-
proximately 30 years for a distance d = 100 km. In this
example, the messages sent at each round only consist of
340 bits.
It is also possible to reduce the distance betweenA1/B1
and A2/B2, at the condition that both the computation
time and the communication time between Ai and Bi
remains negligible compared to d/c. This is necessary to
enforce the non-signaling condition of the CHSHq game.
For instance, if the computation time is on the order of
the microsecond, then d should be at least 300 meters.
Let us conclude by mentioning a few open questions.
Certainly the most pressing one concerns the security of
the protocol against quantum adversaries. A first step in
that direction would be to obtain tight upper bounds on
the entangled value ω∗ of games in CHSHq(p). Another
outstanding problem is whether the bit-commitment pro-
tocol of [16] can be used to obtain an protocol for
Oblivious-Transfer [22]. In particular, this would pave
the way for arbitrary two-party cryptography with se-
curity based on the non-signaling principle. Finally, it
would be particularly interesting to understand whether
2 agents are indeed necessary for each player, or whether
the second agent could for instance be replaced by as-
suming that the spatial positions of Alice and Bob are
known.
Note added.— In an independent and concurrent
work, Fehr and Fillinger [23] proved a general composi-
tion theorem for two-prover commitments which implies
a similar bound on the security of the Lunghi et al. pro-
tocol than the one derived here.
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5Appendix A: Detailed proof of Theorem 1
In this Appendix, we give a formal proof of Theorem 1. We consider the case of a cheating Alice. At round j,
active Alice receives a string bj ∈ Fq and sends back a message yj . From the relativistic constraints, we know that
this message yj is totally independent of bj−1. We can therefore view yj as a function of d, b1, . . . , bj−2, bj . We also
recursively define the functions aj = yj + (bj ∗ aj−1), with a0 = d. These are functions of d, b1, . . . , bj .
Note that if Alice’s performs a probabilistic cheating strategy, her success probability will be the average of the
success probabilities for each possible strategy she performs. It is therefore sufficient to bound Alice’s cheating
probability over all deterministic strategies. Let us then consider a deterministic cheating strategy for Alice: it is fully
determined by the functions yj , as well as a function G(d, b1, . . . , bk−1) that A1 uses to guess ak during the reveal
phase. Alice successfully reveals d iff [G(d, b1, . . . , bk−1) = ak(d, b1, . . . , bk)]. Therefore, we have
1 + ε = Pr[Alice successfully reveals d = 0] + Pr[Alice successfully reveals d = 1]
= Pr
b1,...,bk
[G(0, b1, . . . , bk−1) = ak(0, b1, . . . , bk)] + Pr
b1,...,bk
G(1, b1, . . . , bk−1) = ak(1, b1, . . . , bk)]
= 2 Pr
d,b1,...,bk
[G(d, b1, . . . , bk−1) = ak(d, b1, . . . , bk)].
Intuitively, Alice will be able to win if the function ak is independent of bk, on average on d and the other bi. We
will prove that ak has some large dependence on bk, which will limit Alice’s cheating possibilities. We will actually
show by induction that for each j, the function aj has some large dependency on bj .
We define the independence parameter of function f for a variable y as follows :
Definition 1 (Independence parameter of a variable on a function). Let f : X × Y → Z be a function. The
Independence Parameter of f for variable y ∈ Y, denoted by IP (f ||y), is defined by
IP (f ||y) := max
g:X→Z
[Prx,y [f(x, y) = g(x)]] , (A1)
where we use the uniform measure on X × Y.
By definition, the case IP (f ||y) = 1 corresponds to a function f independent of y. If IP (f ||y) < 1, then the
function f depends on y. The definition of the independence parameter immediately yields 1 + ε = 2IP (ak||bk), and
our goal is therefore to obtain a tight upper bound for IP (ak||bk).
We prove the following :
Proposition 1. ∀j, IP (aj ||bj) ≤ 12 + j
√
2
q .
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on j.
Let us first consider the base case:
IP (a1||b1) = max
g:Fq→Fq
Pr
d,b1
[a1(d, b1) = g(d)] (A2)
where b1 is uniformly distributed in Fq and d is equal to either 0 or 1, each with probability 1/2. Let g the function that
maximizes the above expression, which gives IP (a1||b1) = Prd,b1 [a1(d, b1) = g(d)]. We write a1(d, b1) = y1(b1)+(b1∗d)
for some function y1. We now use the functions g and y1 to construct a strategy for a game G ∈ CHSHq(1/2). We
consider the following game between two players Adeline and Bastian :
• Adeline receives a random element X ∈ Fq. Bastian receives an element Y ∈ Fq which is equal to 0 with
probability 1/2 and 1 with probability 1/2.
• Their goal is to respectively output A and B in Fq such that A+B = X ∗ Y .
The above game is in CHSHq(1/2). Intuitively, we mapped A1 to Adeline and A2 to Bastian, where the input X
corresponds to b1 and the input Y corresponds to d.
We consider the following strategy for this game: Adeline outputs A = y1(X) and Bastian outputs B = −g(Y ).
They win the game iff y1(X)− g(Y ) = X ∗ Y . Therefore, we have
ω(G) ≥ Pr
X,Y
[y1(X)− g(Y ) = X ∗ Y ] = Pr
X,Y
[a1(Y,X) + (X ∗ Y )− g(Y ) = (X ∗ Y )]
= Pr
X,Y
[a1(Y,X) = g(Y )] = IP (a1||b1).
6Combining this lower bound on the value ω(G) of the game with Lemma 1 applied to G ∈ CHSHq(1/2) gives
IP (a1||b1) ≤ ω(G) ≤ 12 +
√
2
q , which establishes the base case.
We now move to the induction step and assume that IP (aj ||bj) ≤ 12 + j
√
2
q . Let us fix h := (d, b1, . . . , bj−1) the
history before time j. Let us define the independence parameter conditioned on the history h:
IP (aj+1||bj+1)h = max
gj+1:Fq→Fq
Pr
bj ,bj+1
[aj+1(h, bj , bj+1) = gj+1(bj)].
Averaging over h gives back the independence parameter: IP (aj+1||bj+1) = Eh[IP (aj+1||bj+1)h]. We write
aj+1(h, bj , bj+1) = y
h
j+1(bj+1) + (bj+1 ∗ aj(h, bj)). Notice that the dependence in bj of the function aj+1(h, bj , bj+1)
lies only in the function aj(h, bj). Therefore, we can write
IP (aj+1||bj+1)h = max
gj+1:Fq→Fq
Pr
bj ,bj+1
[aj+1(h, bj , bj+1) = gj+1(aj(h, bj))].
Let ghj+1 be the function that maximizes the expression:
IP (aj+1||bj+1)h = Pr
bj ,bj+1
[aj+1(h, bj , bj+1) = g
h
j+1(aj(h, bj))].
We now use the functions yhj+1 and ghj+1 to construct a strategy for a game Ghj+1 ∈ CHSHq(IP (aj ||bj)h). We
consider the following game between two players Adeline and Bastian :
• Adeline receives a random element X ∈ Fq. Bastian receives an element Y ∈ Fq such that Pr[Y = c] =
Prbj [aj(h, bj) = c].
• Their goal is to respectively output A and B in Fq such that A+B = X ∗ Y
Intuitively, we mapped the active Alice (during round j+1) to Adeline and the passive Alice to Bastian, where the
input X corresponds to bj+1 and the input Y corresponds to aj . Recall that the active Alice has no information about
bj during step j+1. Therefore, she can determine aj with probability at most: IP (aj ||bj)h := maxc Prbj [aj(h, bj) = c].
This shows that the above game Ghj+1 is in CHSHq(IP (aj ||bj)h).
We consider the following strategy for this game: Adeline outputs A = yhj+1(X) and Bastian outputs B = −ghj+1(Y ).
They win the game iff yhj+1(X)− ghj+1(Y ) = X ∗ Y , which implies that
ω(Ghj+1) ≥ Pr
X,Y
[yhj+1(X)− ghj+1(Y ) = X ∗ Y ]
= Pr
X,bj
[yhj+1(X)− ghj+1(aj(h, bj)) = X ∗ aj(h, bj)] where the distribution over both X and bj is uniform
= Pr
X,bj
[aj+1(h, bj , X) + (aj(h, bj) ∗X)− ghj+1(aj(bj)) = (X ∗ aj(h, bj))]
= Pr
X,bj
[aj+1(h, bj , X) = g
h
j+1(aj(h, bj))]
= IP (aj+1||bj+1)h.
Moreover, Lemma 1 shows that ω(Ghj+1) ≤ IP (aj ||bj)h +
√
2
q since the game G belongs to CHSHq(IP (aj ||bj)h).
Combining both inequalities gives:
IP (aj+1||bj+1)h ≤ IP (aj ||bj)h +
√
2
q
. (A3)
In order to conclude, notice that IP (aj ||bj) = Eh[IP (aj ||bj)h] and IP (aj+1||bj+1) = Eh[IP (aj+1||bj+1)h]. Taking
the expectation of Eq. A3 over the history h finally gives:
IP (aj+1||bj+1) = Eh[IP (aj+1||bj+1)h] ≤ Eh
[
IP (aj ||bj)h +
√
2
q
]
= IP (aj ||bj) +
√
2
q
≤ 1
2
+ (j + 1)
√
2
q
.
Proposition 1 implies that IP (ak||bk) = 12 + k
√
2
q , and the discussion at the beginning of the appendix allows us
to conclude that the protocol is ε-binding with ε = 2k
√
2
q .
